A ttempts to show the presence of mental states in nonhumans in areas such as cognitive ethology and comparative psychology are often accused of anthropomorphism, both in conducting empirical work and in interpreting the results (Kennedy 1992) . Anthropomorphism is the 'attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman things and events ' (e.g. Guthrie 1997) .
It is generally conceived of as a categorical mistake, as it denotes attribution of characteristics considered uniquely human (Fisher 1991 (Fisher , 1996 . 'Category mistakes are made when one treats an entity of one type as if it were an entity of a different type' (Fisher 1991, page 4). Following this reasoning, studies on precursors of typical human cognitive abilities, imputing mental states such as selfawareness, deception and intentionality (e.g. Gallup 1970; Premack & Woodruff 1978; Whiten & Byrne 1988; Parker et al. 1994; de Veer & van den Bos 1999) to nonhumans, are by some deemed fallacious (Kennedy 1992; Heyes 1993 Heyes , 1994 Heyes , 1995 Heyes , 1998 Bekoff & Allen 1997; Davis 1997) .
Opinions on the origin of anthropomorphism are diverse (see Mitchell et al. 1997) . Some hold that anthropomorphism emerged as a cognitive default resulting from human social cognition (e.g. Kennedy 1992) or is an instantiation of an introspective modelling capacity (Eddy et al. 1993; Gallup et al. 1997) . In contrast, others emphasize that anthropomorphism is a product of cultural norms; for example, it is responsible for keeping Western and Japanese primatology apart. 'To the Japanese researchers, questions about the rational uniqueness of humans did not arise and their reports were filled with mentalistic language' (Asquith 1997, page 29). Still others believe anthropomorphism to be rooted in a classical logical error called 'affirming the consequent' (Davis 1997, page 336) . This error, which might result from design faults or tendentious thinking, is what leads us from the fact that 'I scratch my head' and the premise 'I think therefore I scratch my head' to the logically invalid conclusion that 'I think'. When 'affirming the consequent', other reasons such as mosquito bites or fleas leading to scratching, are ignored.
The reasons for shunning anthropomorphism are just as diverse as the suggestions for its origin. This paper focuses on the criticism that anthropomorphism has an unwelcome impact on the collection and interpretation of data on animal behaviour (e.g. Heyes 1987; Kummer et al. 1990; Kennedy 1992) . The essential claim is that anthropomorphism typically involves invalid methods and counteracts 'objective science'. Thus, functional descriptions of behaviour should be avoided in favour of nonmentalistic and neutral descriptions of the interaction of animals with their environment. The term 'functional description' is understood in the sense presented in Kummer et al. (1990, page 90) . They stated: 'With ''Agonistic Buffering'' and later ''Reconciliation'' it became acceptable to name a behavior by its function even when there was no evidence that something was buffered or that someone was reconciliated'. Accordingly, one should elect to describe the actions of one's dog when taking it on a lead by neutral expressions such as jumps, barks, pants, etc. instead of giving interpretive descriptions such as 'expectations of a walk' or 'impatience' which imputes intentional states to the dog. Here, 'intentional' is used in the sense that certain mental states are representational or 'about' other states of affair (Allen 1995). It goes without saying that 'jumping', or 'panting' are considered neutral terms, whereas 'expectations' or 'impatience' are not. In opposition, some commentators reject the concept of neutral descriptions as these are always the result of taking a certain perspective (see de Waal 1991). As stated by Millikan (1997, page 190) : 'One cannot study behavior without making at least implicit reference to the behavior's biological purpose . . . What observations count as among the data for any particular science is never a matter that can be settled apart from theory'. Some scholars even make the general statement that scientific neutrality and objective science refer to idealizations without any real world correlates (for a thorough presentation of this view see Collins & Pinch 1993) . They argue that there is no such thing as a real, public, intersubjectively accessible world independent of the perception of the scientist (see also Rollin 1997; Russell 1997). Hence, the alleged problem of anthropomorphism results from a mistaken belief about the scientific enterprise (Rollin 1998). In this paper, I focus more specifically on the epistemological question of how we get to know about the existence of mental states in others. Many who level the
